"The C.I.A. has said that its initial information about the use of mobile
trailers as biological weapons laboratories came from a former Iraqi
scientist, and that the discovery of the trailers appeared to have
confirmed intelligence that he provided."

We now know that a lot of what the NeoCons and ChickenHawks based their
intelligence on was from former Iraqui's and that data proved to be false.
Is the CIA here basing their proof on false data again?

"Tempest" <tempest@hotmail.com> wrote in message
news:3EFB721C.5204F39C@hotmail.com...
> Agency Disputes C.I.A. View of Trailers as Iraqi Weapons Labs
>
> By DOUGLAS JEHL
>
> http://www.nytimes.com/2003/06/26/in...al/26WEAP.html
>
> WASHINGTON, June 25 - The State Department's intelligence division is
> disputing the Central Intelligence Agency's conclusion that mysterious
> trailers found in Iraq were for making biological weapons, United States
> government officials said today.
>
> In a classified June 2 memorandum, the officials said, the department's
> Bureau of Intelligence and Research said it was premature to conclude
> that the trailers were evidence of an Iraqi biological weapons program,
> as President Bush has done. The disclosure of the memorandum is the
> clearest sign yet of disagreement between intelligence agencies over the
> assertion, which was produced jointly by the C.I.A. and the Defense
> Intelligence Agency and made public on May 28 on the C.I.A. Web site.
> Officials said the C.I.A. and D.I.A. did not consult with other
> intelligence agencies before issuing the report.
>
> The report on the trailers was initially prepared for the White House,
> and Mr. Bush has cited it as proof that Iraq indeed had a biological
> weapons program, as the United States has repeatedly alleged, although
> it has yet to produce any other conclusive evidence.
>
> In an interview with Polish television on May 30, Mr. Bush cited the
> trailers as evidence that the United States had "found the weapons of
> mass destruction" it was looking for. Secretary of State Colin L. Powell
> echoed that assessment in a public statement the next day, saying that
> the accuracy of prewar assessments linking Iraqi trailers to a
> biological weapons program had been borne out by the discovery.
>
> Some intelligence analysts had previously disputed the C.I.A. report,
> but it had not been known that the C.I.A. report did not reflect an
> interagency consensus or that any intelligence agency had later objected
> to its finding.
>
> The State Department bureau raised its objections in a memorandum to Mr.
> Powell, according to Congressional officials. They said the memorandum
> was cast as a dissent to the C.I.A. report, and that it said that the
> evidence found to date did not justify the conclusion that the trailers
> could have had no other purpose than for use as mobile weapons
> laboratories.
>
> The State Department spokesman, Richard A. Boucher, said tonight: "I'm
> not in a position to comment on reports of classified memorandum from
> our intelligence folks." But a State Department official who spoke on
> condition of anonymity said: "We do rely on I&R for their best judgment
> on things, but when you weigh in all the factors, the C.I.A. and D.I.A.
> folks are the ones who have been out there, and their conclusion was
> that these trailers were mobile labs." An administration official
> sympathetic to Mr. Powell said the memo put him in an uncomfortable
> position, but would not characterize Mr. Powell's view of its findings.
>
> The reasons cited in the State Department memorandum to justify its
> dissent could not be learned. But in interviews earlier this month in
> Washington and the Middle East, American and British analysts with
> direct access to the evidence also disputed the C.I.A.'s claims, saying
> that the mobile units were more likely intended for other purposes and
> that the evaluation process had been damaged by a rush to judgment.
>
> Administration officials said one argument made in the State Department
> report was that each of the two trailers and one laboratory discovered
> by the United States in Iraq could constitute only part of what the
> C.I.A. report said it believed had been two- or three-trailer systems
> necessary for the manufacture of ch emical weapons. The missing trailers
> have not been found.
>
> Among the alternative purposes for the trailers that the State
> Department report described as plausible were that they had been
> intended for the refueling of Iraqi missiles, one administration
> official said.
>
> The State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research is a small
> but important agency in the intelligence community. Its principal
> purpose is to provide the Secretary of State and his top advisers with
> intelligence analysis independent of other agencies, but it also has a
> voice in the drafting of national intelligence estimates and other
> documents that are supposed to reflect the consensus of the intelligence
> community.
>
> The fact that the C.I.A. and the D.I.A. did not consult with other
> agencies in producing the so-called white paper reflects a rare but not
> unknown approach, officials from the intelligence agencies and Congress
> said. The government's intelligence apparatus spans more than a dozen
> agencies, and officials usually try to reach consensus before making
> their findings public.
>
> The exclusion of the State Department's intelligence bureau and other
> agencies seemed unusual, several government officials said, because of
> the high-profile subject.
>
> Administration officials said the State Department agency was given no
> warning that the C.I.A. report was being produced, or made public.
>
> A C.I.A. official defended the process by which the agency reached its
> conclusion, saying that the C.I.A. and the D.I.A. were most intimately
> familiar with the physical evidence and human intelligence related to
> the trailers, and were thus most qualified to issue public findings. But
> a Defense Department official acknowledged today that some analysts in
> the D.I.A. in Iraq had also objected to the conclusions.
>
> The C.I.A. has said that its initial information about the use of mobile
> trailers as biological weapons laboratories came from a former Iraqi
> scientist, and that the discovery of the trailers appeared to have
> confirmed intelligence that he provided.
>
> "We didn't shop that paper around because we were the ones who were most
> knowledgeable about it," the C.I.A. official said. "We were the ones who
> knew from a former Iraqi scientist what to expect, and we didn't have to
> ask a handful of people in small agencies."
>
> But administration officials sympathetic to the State Department said
> that the department's intelligence bureau felt it had been deliberately
> shut out of the process. The intelligence bureau has been more skeptical
> than the C.I.A. and D.I.A. on matters related to Iraq's suspected
> illicit weapons program and its ties to terrorism.
>
> An intelligence official sympathetic to the C.I.A. view said the State
> Department intelligence bureau's skepticism had been well known and that
> seeking its input on the report would have served no useful purpose.
>
> The C.I.A. official said the State Department document was an internal
> memorandum and that it had not been read by George Tenet, the director
> of central intelligence, or other officials at the agency.
>
> --
> "To announce that there must be no criticism of the president, or that
> we are to stand by the president right or wrong, is not only unpatriotic
> and servile, but is morally treasonable to the American public."
> Teddy Roosevelt

Michael wrote:

>"The C.I.A. has said that its initial information about the use of mobile
>trailers as biological weapons laboratories came from a former Iraqi
>scientist, and that the discovery of the trailers appeared to have
>confirmed intelligence that he provided."
>
>We now know that a lot of what the NeoCons and ChickenHawks based their
>intelligence on was from former Iraqui's and that data proved to be false.
>Is the CIA here basing their proof on false data again?
>

Seems the conservative-biased NY Times has again dropped the ball.
Nowhere in this article do I see mention of the most likely use for the
two trailers that were discovered. They were almost certainly used to
fill weather balloons with hydrogen. A pair of trailers of similar
description were sold to the Iraqis by a British firm in 1987 for
support of their mobile artillery systems, exactly what former Iraqi
officials have claimed. The Iraqi scientist who talked about mobile
labs was probably one of the INC cohorts famed for telling our
intelligence people what they wanted to hear. This has been all around
the foreign press, but largely ignored here in the U.S.

>
>"Tempest" <tempest@hotmail.com> wrote in message
>news:3EFB721C.5204F39C@hotmail.com...
>
>
>>Agency Disputes C.I.A. View of Trailers as Iraqi Weapons Labs
>>
>>By DOUGLAS JEHL
>>
>>http://www.nytimes.com/2003/06/26/in...al/26WEAP.html
>>
>>WASHINGTON, June 25 - The State Department's intelligence division is
>>disputing the Central Intelligence Agency's conclusion that mysterious
>>trailers found in Iraq were for making biological weapons, United States
>>government officials said today.
>>
>>In a classified June 2 memorandum, the officials said, the department's
>>Bureau of Intelligence and Research said it was premature to conclude
>>that the trailers were evidence of an Iraqi biological weapons program,
>>as President Bush has done. The disclosure of the memorandum is the
>>clearest sign yet of disagreement between intelligence agencies over the
>>assertion, which was produced jointly by the C.I.A. and the Defense
>>Intelligence Agency and made public on May 28 on the C.I.A. Web site.
>>Officials said the C.I.A. and D.I.A. did not consult with other
>>intelligence agencies before issuing the report.
>>
>>The report on the trailers was initially prepared for the White House,
>>and Mr. Bush has cited it as proof that Iraq indeed had a biological
>>weapons program, as the United States has repeatedly alleged, although
>>it has yet to produce any other conclusive evidence.
>>
>>In an interview with Polish television on May 30, Mr. Bush cited the
>>trailers as evidence that the United States had "found the weapons of
>>mass destruction" it was looking for. Secretary of State Colin L. Powell
>>echoed that assessment in a public statement the next day, saying that
>>the accuracy of prewar assessments linking Iraqi trailers to a
>>biological weapons program had been borne out by the discovery.
>>
>>Some intelligence analysts had previously disputed the C.I.A. report,
>>but it had not been known that the C.I.A. report did not reflect an
>>interagency consensus or that any intelligence agency had later objected
>>to its finding.
>>
>>The State Department bureau raised its objections in a memorandum to Mr.
>>Powell, according to Congressional officials. They said the memorandum
>>was cast as a dissent to the C.I.A. report, and that it said that the
>>evidence found to date did not justify the conclusion that the trailers
>>could have had no other purpose than for use as mobile weapons
>>laboratories.
>>
>>The State Department spokesman, Richard A. Boucher, said tonight: "I'm
>>not in a position to comment on reports of classified memorandum from
>>our intelligence folks." But a State Department official who spoke on
>>condition of anonymity said: "We do rely on I&R for their best judgment
>>on things, but when you weigh in all the factors, the C.I.A. and D.I.A.
>>folks are the ones who have been out there, and their conclusion was
>>that these trailers were mobile labs." An administration official
>>sympathetic to Mr. Powell said the memo put him in an uncomfortable
>>position, but would not characterize Mr. Powell's view of its findings.
>>
>>The reasons cited in the State Department memorandum to justify its
>>dissent could not be learned. But in interviews earlier this month in
>>Washington and the Middle East, American and British analysts with
>>direct access to the evidence also disputed the C.I.A.'s claims, saying
>>that the mobile units were more likely intended for other purposes and
>>that the evaluation process had been damaged by a rush to judgment.
>>
>>Administration officials said one argument made in the State Department
>>report was that each of the two trailers and one laboratory discovered
>>by the United States in Iraq could constitute only part of what the
>>C.I.A. report said it believed had been two- or three-trailer systems
>>necessary for the manufacture of ch emical weapons. The missing trailers
>>have not been found.
>>
>>Among the alternative purposes for the trailers that the State
>>Department report described as plausible were that they had been
>>intended for the refueling of Iraqi missiles, one administration
>>official said.
>>
>>The State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research is a small
>>but important agency in the intelligence community. Its principal
>>purpose is to provide the Secretary of State and his top advisers with
>>intelligence analysis independent of other agencies, but it also has a
>>voice in the drafting of national intelligence estimates and other
>>documents that are supposed to reflect the consensus of the intelligence
>>community.
>>
>>The fact that the C.I.A. and the D.I.A. did not consult with other
>>agencies in producing the so-called white paper reflects a rare but not
>>unknown approach, officials from the intelligence agencies and Congress
>>said. The government's intelligence apparatus spans more than a dozen
>>agencies, and officials usually try to reach consensus before making
>>their findings public.
>>
>>The exclusion of the State Department's intelligence bureau and other
>>agencies seemed unusual, several government officials said, because of
>>the high-profile subject.
>>
>>Administration officials said the State Department agency was given no
>>warning that the C.I.A. report was being produced, or made public.
>>
>>A C.I.A. official defended the process by which the agency reached its
>>conclusion, saying that the C.I.A. and the D.I.A. were most intimately
>>familiar with the physical evidence and human intelligence related to
>>the trailers, and were thus most qualified to issue public findings. But
>>a Defense Department official acknowledged today that some analysts in
>>the D.I.A. in Iraq had also objected to the conclusions.
>>
>>The C.I.A. has said that its initial information about the use of mobile
>>trailers as biological weapons laboratories came from a former Iraqi
>>scientist, and that the discovery of the trailers appeared to have
>>confirmed intelligence that he provided.
>>
>>"We didn't shop that paper around because we were the ones who were most
>>knowledgeable about it," the C.I.A. official said. "We were the ones who
>>knew from a former Iraqi scientist what to expect, and we didn't have to
>>ask a handful of people in small agencies."
>>
>>But administration officials sympathetic to the State Department said
>>that the department's intelligence bureau felt it had been deliberately
>>shut out of the process. The intelligence bureau has been more skeptical
>>than the C.I.A. and D.I.A. on matters related to Iraq's suspected
>>illicit weapons program and its ties to terrorism.
>>
>>An intelligence official sympathetic to the C.I.A. view said the State
>>Department intelligence bureau's skepticism had been well known and that
>>seeking its input on the report would have served no useful purpose.
>>
>>The C.I.A. official said the State Department document was an internal
>>memorandum and that it had not been read by George Tenet, the director
>>of central intelligence, or other officials at the agency.
>>
>>--
>>"To announce that there must be no criticism of the president, or that
>>we are to stand by the president right or wrong, is not only unpatriotic
>>and servile, but is morally treasonable to the American public."
>>Teddy Roosevelt
>>
>>
>
>
>
>

--
William J. Rood
Rochester, MN